Contradictions and the Persistence of the Mobilizing Frames of Privatization: interrogating the global evidence on low-fee private schooling

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1. Setting the Scene

I have been working on low-fee private schooling for over a decade. In 2001, when I first began researching the sector, there were almost no published studies in the scholarly literature on the topic. Technical reports on the use of unrecognised or ‘spontaneous’ forms of private schooling by lower-income households had started to emerge. An influential monograph by James Tooley (1999) based on a consultancy for the International Finance Corporation on emerging forms of private involvement in education captured the attention of policy elites. In international development and domestic policy circles, people spoke of ‘budget schools’, ‘private schools for the poor’, ‘new types of private schools’, or ‘teaching shops’ in amazed or derisory terms to describe this, as yet, undefined but seemingly tangibly different type of private schooling. However, until I was compelled to operationalize what seemed to me at the time, a nebulous set of independently owned and operated private schools claiming to serve socially and economically disadvantaged groups for my own study, the term, ‘low-fee private schooling’, did not exist (see Srivastava, 2013 for historical review).

What at first seemed like an atomised phenomenon of individual schools ‘mushrooming’ in specific contexts where there was little or poor quality state provision, has now taken root as a phenomenon of scale, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Notably, as the Education For All (EFA) movement has progressed, private provision has increased in number and type (Patrinos et al., 2009). So too, has the vociferous debate on privatisation. Within this debate, the emergence and potential place of the low-fee private sector holds an important and divisive place.

The low-fee private sector, particularly the controversial work of James Tooley, has caught the attention of a powerful faction of international policy elites and influential private non-state actors. In view of generally accepted claims of poor state sector quality in many developing countries, it is often posited as ‘the poor’s best chance’ (Tooley, 2000) against concerns of the state’s fundamental duty to provide basic education to all (Lewin, 2007; Watkins, 2004).

This paper attempts to analyse the rapid and global scaling-up of low-fee private schooling alongside the increased attention to and global compact on EFA. Elsewhere, I
argue that the seeming paradox of increased privatisation within the context of EFA is a result of the limited number of policy options that were legitimised by key policy actors of the movement, due to its internally contentious alliance (Srivastava, 2010a).¹

Building on this argument, I make the following key points:

1. There has undoubtedly been inadequate government provision of schooling in many contexts but, privatisation (or slices of privatisation), which may once have been a default strategy, is becoming the strategy of design.

2. Ideology aside, the evidence on issues of access, affordability, and quality of low-fee private schooling in basic and secondary education is inconclusive. Totalising claims on the affordability, better quality, and equity leveraging potential of the low-fee private sector in developing countries should be treated with caution.

3. Despite the emerging evidence on low-fee private schooling, there are strong pushes by international networks of influential organisations and an array of ‘new/non-traditional’ private non-state actors in education (corporates, think tanks, consultancy firms, etc.) to invest in and expand them.

4. This project, and broader action on privatisation in education, is realised by what I call, ‘technicist empiricism’. I define this as a process involving a number of simultaneous activities, and specific mental models.

5. These processes and mental models legitimise and mobilise action around privatisation and low-fee private schooling through four mobilizing frames, which I outline as: scarce resources, efficiency, competition-choice-quality, and social equity.

2. Global Initiatives Scaling-up the Low-fee Private Sector

Despite the inconclusive emerging evidence on low-fee private schooling (see McLoughlin, 2013; Srivastava, 2013 for reviews) there are strong pushes by international networks of influential organisations and an array of ‘new/non-traditional’ private non-state actors in education (i.e. corporates, think tanks, consultancy firms, etc.) to invest in and expand them. For advocates of increased private provision, this is a welcome development given acknowledged state sector dysfunctions in many developing countries. James Tooley asserts, ‘school chains with names such as EasyLearn or Virgin Opportunity could be as reliable as, say, Sainsbury’s or Boots’ (Wilby, 2013). Bridge International Academies bills itself as ‘the Starbucks’ of schools in developing countries.

The current discourse framing the rapid expansion of private provision and low-fee private schooling morphs the metaphor of the market to such degree that there is little consideration of whether the claim to a fundamental right (basic education) and provision of a social good to the poor and disadvantaged are really comparable to middle-class supermarkets, pharmacies, and coffee shops. Even Milton Friedman...

¹ This work extends Mundy and Murphy’s (2001) compelling analysis of the evolution of the EFA movement.
(1962), the revered champion of the marketization of education for proponents, conceded the role of the state in ensuring basic education for all, noting that the peculiarities of education meant it could not be treated as a pure market.2

Evidence of global initiatives in the global scaling-up of low-fee private schooling is fragmented and opaque, but a few notable examples are presented here.3

In 2009, the IDP Foundation, an American private foundation, in partnership with Sinapi Aba Trust, a Ghanaian microfinance institution, started the Rising Schools Program, a micro-finance initiative for low-fee private school owners in Ghana. Loans are provided at high interest (above 15%) (Pritzker, 2011). The programme is reported as having reached 206 schools, with an aim to expand to 1200 schools in seven regions over five years, and have an estimated impact on 350,000 students (IDP Foundation, no date). This initiative followed reports of a USAID programme due to run until 2013 and managed by the Mitchell Group, a private contracting firm, to train low-fee private school owners and managers in Ghana, and access to loans through Opportunities International Savings and Loans, a local microfinance firm (CDC Consult, 2010).

In 2007, the Orient Global Foundation, the philanthropic arm of Orient Global (now Chandler Corporation), a Singapore-based investment firm, established an education fund of $100 million focusing on the market for low-fee private schools (Coulson, 2007). James Tooley was the founding president of the Orient Global Education Fund. He later broke with the fund, but according to his website, created Empathy Schools, a chain of low-fee schools in Hyderabad, India, and with a local partner in Ghana, is co-founder and chairman of Omega Schools, another chain of low-fee schools that started in 2009 (EG West Centre, no date, section ‘James Tooley’).

Pearson, owner of the Financial Times and the world’s largest educational publisher, was recently reported as launching a £10 million ($15 million) fund to invest in low-fee private schools across Asia and Africa (Tran, 2012). Through the Pearson Affordable Learning Fund (PALF), it is a key player in some of the most publicised initiatives scaling-up low-fee private schooling, with a focus on ‘profitability’. It ‘makes minority equity investments in for-profit companies to meet a growing demand for affordable education services’ (Pearson PLC, 2012, para 1). PALF initiatives are currently operating in India, Kenya, and Ghana from pre-school to secondary education.

Pearson’s chief education adviser is Sir Michael Barber, formerly a top aide to Tony Blair, and an old friend of Tooley’s from when they taught in Zimbabwe together years ago. Last year, Pearson took a stake in Omega Schools, allowing it to expand throughout Ghana at speed. From the 40 schools and 20,000 students it was reported as having in 2013, Tooley predicts 100 schools with 50,000 students by 2014 (Wilby, 2013).

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2 Friedman (1962) outlined the need for the state in education because of potential negative ‘neighbourhood effects’ (i.e. the negative societal consequences of not attending school or attending school of low quality on others in society), and the ‘paternalistic concern for children and other irresponsible individuals’ (p. 86) to compel and enforce compulsory education.

3 The Center for Education Innovations, described as an initiative of the Results for Development Institute (R4D), lists a number of low-fee private school initiatives on its website. It is unclear how these are compiled or classed as ‘innovations’. See http://www.educationinnovations.org/topics/low-cost-private-schools
Beginning in June 2012, Pearson is also reported as investing in Bridge International Academies, purportedly the world’s largest chain of low-fee nursery and primary schools (Wilby, 2013). It is unclear how many other investors Bridge has. Its website lists four venture capital firms as ‘some’ of its ‘biggest’ investors.4 Bridge’s ‘Academy-in-a-Box’ approach is marketed as having ‘re-engineered the entire lifecycle of basic education, leveraging data, technology, and scale’ to keep quality up and prices low (Bridge International Academies, 2013a). From its first academy in 2009 in Kenya, Bridge had 134 schools at the beginning of 2013 (Bridge International Academies, 2013b). It plans operate in at least 12 countries across Sub-Saharan African and India, and have more than 10 million students by 2023 (Omidyar Network, no date).

Most of these initiatives have used Tooley’s early research as their impetus and justification. It is easy to see why. Tooley and Dixon’s (2003) initial report on India stressed the profitability of low-fee private schools even as relatively small, single operations by individuals without the backing of ‘big’ capital: ‘running a school even for low-income families was potentially a profitable undertaking, with estimated profits of about 25% in the year of recognition’ (p. 19).

They recommended establishing public and private voucher schemes, education service companies, education loan companies, and ‘the liberalisation of the regulatory environment regarding private unaided schools making a surplus’ (Tooley & Dixon, 2003, p. 22). As highlighted above, Tooley is personally involved and invested in establishing and experimenting with these kinds of initiatives. A network analysis of his influence by Nambissan and Ball (2010) further shows the prominent role he has played in shaping discourse around low-fee private schooling and school choice.

While Tooley’s journalistic commentary, grey literature, informal reports, and autobiographical book on his association with private schooling (Tooley, 2009) have been widely disseminated in high-level policy circles and networks of private non-state actors, the growing body of other commentary, and notably, research evidence on low-fee private schooling, fails to garner such attention. This is not for lack of effort on the part of some equally high-profile researchers and activists to engage in policy advocacy through social media and high-level policy fora.

Overlooked work includes Tooley and his team’s own refereed published research, which is generally more technical in tone and, when closely read, reveals important nuances in results on relative achievement in low-fee and state schools, concerns with equity, and education corruption at the highest levels (e.g. Dixon et al., 2013; Tooley & Dixon, 2005; Tooley et al., 2010; Rangaraju et al., 2012). These findings are similar to results of other studies (e.g. Akaguri, 2011; Chudgar & Quin, 2012; Fennell & Malik, 2012; Härmä, 2009; 2011; Ohara, 2013; Rose & Adelabu, 2007; Srivastava, 2007; 2008b).

So, how may we explain the capture of discourse and high-level attention by some ‘evidence’ and research over others?

4 These are listed as: NEA, the ‘world’s largest venture capital firm’; LearnCapital; Khosla Ventures (run by Vinod Khosla, one of the co-founders of Sun Microsystems); and Omidyar Network, a social investment firm of eBay founder, Pierre Omidyar (Bridge International Academies, 2013c).
3. Scaling-up: Tacit ‘Partnerships’ and Privatisation

The involvement of certain private non-state actors may be more immediately explained by the profitability of the low-fee private sector. However, scaling-up the low-fee private sector by these actors is also tacitly enabled by national governments, most recently, under the guise of public-private partnerships (PPPs), partnership constituting the education buzzword du jour.

Cornwall (2007) explains: ‘buzzwords gain their purchase and power through their vague and euphemistic qualities, their capacity to embrace a multitude of possible meanings, and their normative resonance’ (p. 472). Their ability to signify what is en vogue is ensconced within a logic of taken-for-grantedness and can ‘cloud meanings...through a language of evasion’ (Cornwall, 2010, p. 3). In the current context, ‘partnership’ is as ‘ubiquitous as community, evoking much the same warm mutuality’ (Cornwall, 2007, p. 475), but it is precisely its ubiquity that renders partnership ‘a floating empty signifier’ (Burgos, 2004).

In an attempt to more radically define the term, Pickard (2007) suggests that: ‘partnership denotes a special relationship between equal participants, or yes, partners, who enjoy a distinctive bond of trust, a shared analysis of existing conditions in society, and thus in general a common orientation of what needs to be done to construct a more just, equitable, and democratic world’ (p. 575, emphasis added). However, the social justice ideal mentioned above is conspicuously missing from most discussions in favour of the vagaries of partnership as ‘a universal – almost a neutral – value upon which all specific agents and governments in general, would agree’ (Burgos, 2004, p. 58).

I argue that the seemingly convivial mutuality of the term ‘partnership’ obscures the fundamentally altered mode of governance under PPP arrangements, particularly with the introduction of new/non-traditional (and for-profit) private non-state actors in education. The notion of mutuality persists despite lessons emerging from countries with longer histories of PPP-friendly institutional frameworks that large-scale PPP arrangements are not only more risky for the public sector, as there are fewer actors to bear the risk, but also that they operate with vested interests against those of the public, can lead to more complicated regulatory frameworks not less, and that they have the potential of becoming ‘abusive’ if the stronger partner dominates (Coulson 2005; van Marrewijk et al., 2008).

India, Pakistan, and Uganda are examples of countries that have recently instituted PPP arrangements for non-state actors (including, in some cases, corporate and international actors) to take over the management, operation, and establishment of schools. These arrangements fuel the scaling-up of the low-fee private sector by design, not default.

In 2007, Uganda’s Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) adopted a PPP policy to universalise secondary education. In the MOES vision, PPPs are positioned as vehicles through which quality education can be achieved (MOES, no date, section ‘The Department’s Mission and Vision’). A PPP programme has been launched with the aim of: ‘Identifying private schools to partner with government in implementing USE’ (MOES, no date, section ‘Programmes’). The Rockefeller Foundation’s response to
'build[s] and manage[s] a network of low-cost, high quality, sustainable secondary schools in Uganda' (rockefellerfoundation.org, 2013) is an example of a direct response to the call.

In Pakistan, the Sindh Education Foundation launched the ‘Promoting Private Schooling in Rural Sindh Project’ in 2008, designed in collaboration with the World Bank. The scheme aims to support 1000 new private schools in underserved areas in 10 districts (Sindh Education Foundation, no date, p. 7). ‘Entrepreneurs’ are invited to establish lower-fee private schools in rural areas but are barred from charging tuition fees to students. Schools are meant to receive a subsidy of Rs. 350/month/boy and Rs. 450/month/girl enrolled. This model is predated by the Punjab Education Foundation’s Foundation Assisted School programme which runs along similar lines (Punjab Education Foundation, 2014).

The All Private School Management Association has appealed to the government to view low-fee schools in Sindh outside the scheme as necessary partners in expanding education access. It is asking for government grants to fund these private schools to ‘salvage their crumbling’ finances (The International News, 2014). However, it simultaneously argues that the government should stop its ‘Adopt-A-School Programme’, another PPP initiative in Sindh, where private individuals can adopt government schools, arguing that this funnels away necessary education resources.

My analysis of India’s Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Five Year Development Plans showed that the broader macro-planning process successively facilitated PPPs in education, and a decreased role for the state in education financing, management, and regulation (Srivastava 2010b; Srivastava et al., 2013). This is despite the limited role officially accorded to the private sector in the Government of India’s Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Education for All) programme, which focused on expanding state provision since 2000. Under an unspecified ‘PPP mode’, the PPP discourse has been sufficiently broadened to allow a range of actors with different motives to enter in the schooling space. This has included opening up the sector to private companies under their philanthropic arms to start low-fee private schools.

Positioning low-fee private schools as PPP initiatives is a notable shift in policy discourse and practice, which should not go amiss. In the countries cited above, traditional models that could be likened to public-private arrangements before the term was en vogue did not include the possibility of corporations or individual ‘entrepreneurs’ running schools, or schools running for a profit. Instead, these were usually community-run, or run by a charity, religious order, or trust (e.g. private-aided schools, madrasas, missionary schools) under very different regulatory environments and compulsions.

The language of PPPs was neither used to describe low-fee private schools, nor were such schools thus conceptualised. Conversely, until very recently, none of the research on low-fee private schools (including Tooley’s) positioned them as PPPs. It focused instead on their for-profit or unregulated/unrecognised nature which fell outside the

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5 The Sindh Education Foundation and the Punjab Education Foundation were established by the government as semi-autonomous and autonomous institutions, respectively.

6 It is, in fact, illegal to run schools for a profit in India.
regulatory framework of most countries. In essence, the ‘PPP creep’ in the low-fee private sector normalises and encourages a school sector that, until recently, was seen as usurping state regulation.

Thus, we may take the scaling-up of the low-fee private sector through the more palatable partnership discourse as one example of the duplicity of a strengthened commitment to market-based strategies, privatisation in particular, in an era of ‘free and compulsory education for all’, and going forward post-2015. This is facilitated through the exigence of a normative preference for some warm and fuzzy notion of ‘partnership’, and the supposed technical superiority of the private sector.

In the examples above, words such as ‘nurture’, ‘encourage’, and ‘facilitate’ are repeatedly used in government documents to outline desired action regarding PPPs and (low-fee) private schools. The language of ‘good quality’ is strongly entrenched to describe private schools against public schools. The logical but unsaid conclusion is that the higher fee, the better the school. But, given the amounts of public monies made available to education, states can only subsidise a fraction of low-fee private schools under PPP arrangements. In effect, low-fee private schools are a concession even within the private sector given the simultaneous compulsion to universalise access (i.e. the ‘best’ that can be made available to the poor among supposedly better private school supply).

In the remainder of the paper, I begin to theorise the global scaling-up of the low-fee private sector as mobilised by explicating the underlying logics of privatisation and the persistence of its mobilizing frames. It must be reiterated that the ideas presented here, particularly regarding the theoretical construct of ‘technicist empiricism’, are works in progress. The aim of this paper is to engage with a critical community in order to further develop this work.

4. Propagating Mobilizing Frames: Towards an Understanding of ‘Technicist Empiricism’

The implementation and enactment of education policy are not neutral acts. Numerous scholars have shown the conceptualisation and implementation of education policy to be complex processes infused with political agendas, concerns with legitimacy, competing interests, and exercises in asserting bargaining power by different (unequally weighted) actors. From the new institutional economic approach, the formal institutions governing education policy, or the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990), are not technicist exercises of increasing the effectiveness or efficiency of education delivery and provision. North (1990) is explicit about these concerns: ‘Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules’ (p. 16).

By extension, the expanded array of new/non-traditional private non-state actors operating outside formal education policy spaces and within a narrative of scarce public resources, lends itself to the potential capture of those spaces by actors with commercial interests. Pro-market/private institutional evolution in basic education is
facilitated by a parallel meta-narrative of ‘globalisation’ undergirded by seemingly technical solutions. This at once signifies state action (i.e. opening up national boundaries to outside actors; liberalising education, health, and other social sectors; creating conditions to allow a diversification of agents to act in social sectors), but in so doing, enables state inaction (Mok, 2005) in areas of public education governance; and may, as some have argued, facilitate a willing retreat of the state.

This creates a new form of education governance, that Robertson (2008) astutely terms ‘multilateral marketization’, which significantly expands the role for the private (in particular, for-profit) sector, and

in which a coalition of global actors have advanced private sector (governance) solutions – such as public-private partnerships/multi-stakeholder partnerships/emerging markets – to a key public sector problem – access to education/access to quality education across the globe. There is no regulator of last resort (p. 8).

Building on these theoretical persuasions, I argue that the global scaling-up of low-fee private schooling and the broader project of privatisation in education is realised by, what I call, ‘technicist empiricism’. I define this as a process involving a number of simultaneous activities, and specific mental models. These are:

- The selective use of what is considered ‘evidence’ through a careful process of cherry-picking research. This process discounts certain methodologies, and thus, excludes a number of studies, researchers, and entire bodies of work
  - i.e. RCTs as the ‘gold standard’ for research on education interventions; a preference for ‘big n’ studies; econometrics as analysis extraordinaire; economics as the ‘hard’ science amongst all other social science disciplines, and thus, more robust

- Magnifying evidence that is in line with ideological positions closely associated to nominal concerns of ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’, and ‘competition’
  - Concerns here are nominal because, regarding: (1) efficiency: there is a preference for crude over productive efficiency; full cost of investment is discounted (i.e. cost of public investment in roads, villages, access to urban facilities8; bribes made to recognise or register schools; public sector land acquired at concessory rates; tax breaks); (2) effectiveness: is measured by crude school effectiveness studies of inputs and outputs (i.e.

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7 The conception of mental models here follows the Northian argument against the rational choice framework. Mental models are defined as the ‘mental constructs through which they [actors] understand the environment and solve the problems they confront’ (North, 1990, p. 20). As a societal aggregate they become ideologies, which in turn, guide institutional evolution and development: ‘ideologies and institutions can then be viewed as classes of shared mental models (Denzau & North, 1994, p. 4); and ‘...the shared mental constructs that guide choices and shape the evolution of political-economic systems and societies (Denzau & North, 1994, p. 5).

8 It has been shown that low-fee private and other private schools tend to operate in urban areas or high infrastructure villages (discussed below).
achievement results) and does not analyse long-term social mobility or social cohesion processes and outcomes; (3) competition: follows an incomplete analysis when low-cost private sector mechanics suggest there is collusion of low-cost private and high-cost schools to circumvent rules; the state sector has little incentive mechanisms to compete or improve; ‘exit’ is not a lever for quality recuperation in systems with incomplete information or few (if any) incentives

- A preference for simplistic linear solutions (i.e. the silver bullet in development) and the potential of their decontextualized multiplication effect
  - i.e. the ‘school kit’ or ‘school-in-a-box’ model does not take into account the contextual specificity of school access, intersecting social inequities that effect access and retention, and specific configurations of public and private school availability in micro-level contexts

- The mobilisation of that evidence to scale in exclusive and exclusionary global networks by asserting bargaining power and capitalising on the cachet that particular actors have in international and domestic policy arenas
  - i.e. the role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ deeply embedded in the infrastructure of neoliberal organisations internationally and locally with access to transnational advocacy networks and large financial resources (Nambissan & Ball, 2010)

- The view of education as primarily a vehicle for human capital development. Thus, children are not seen as future critical thinking citizens, but as the next generation of ‘global economic citizens’, whose place in the changing world order will be secured primarily as workers to advance the domestic or international agendas of global competitiveness.
  - This is facilitated by international and multilateral agency discourse and a broader discourse of the knowledge economy and the ‘global silicon valley’ valorised as pathways to ‘quick’ economic development (e.g. India)

Thus, the concept of technicist empiricism sees potentially transformative aspects of education ‘reform’ as often muted or snuffed out through an increasing global discourse on education that is purportedly technical, and an over-reliance on ‘the magic of the market’ (Ball, 1998). This has led to the legitimation of a limited set of policy options (Ball 1998; Mok, 2005; Mundy, 2006; Srivastava 2010a) in the current global education ‘policyscape’ (Appadurai, 1990; Carney, 2009), which are seen to be transplanted (in the case of weaker developing country governments) or translated (in the case of less aid dependent) local contexts (Mukhopadhyay & Sriprakash, 2011).

Technicist approaches rely on the galvanisation of policy action through mobilizing frames or ‘ways in which global educational problems and their solutions are talked about and used to legitimate and motivate collective action’ (Mundy & Murphy, 2001, p. 91) to strategically coalesce action around particular issues identified as ‘problems’ in
education discourse. Building on Stephen Ball’s work, I begin with the premise that this limited set of legitimised policy options is driven by two significant pushes.

The first ‘aims to tie education more closely to national economic interests, while the second involves a decoupling of education from direct state control’ (Ball, 1998, p. 125), and accepting the ‘magic of the market’. The magic of the market is driven by a simplistic approach to complex historical, political, social, and institutional problems in education. It helps efface significant gender, class, caste, and other socio-economic factors that are shown to characterise and problematise access to low-fee private schooling, and education more generally. Both pushes are relevant to understanding the global scaling-up of low-fee private schooling, which we may theorise as propagated by the use of mobilizing frames or ‘collective action frames’ (Benford & Snow, 2000) by influential (often supra-national) policy actors:

Frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action. Collective action frames also perform this interpretive function by simplifying and condensing aspects of the ‘world out there’, but in ways that are ‘intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614).

The frames provide credibility through their apparent ‘consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of the frame articulators’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619). Thus, by tactically using mobilizing frames, powerful actors legitimise particular policy options, presenting them as the solutions to complex problems, and mute contestation, or alternatively, morph slices of counter-arguments to support desired ends. The apparent consistency of the mobilizing frames is carefully crafted: ‘Slices of observed, experienced, and/or “recorded reality” are assembled, collated, and packaged’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623, emphasis added) so that they seemingly hang together. The mobilizing frames are simultaneously flexible and inclusive to allow the incorporation of contested meanings which may otherwise be oppositional, and in the case of education, camouflage deep social fissures.

In the process of presenting a cohesive narrative which will have the best chances of being accepted, the messiness of contestation is muted or snuffed out, and seemingly straightforward technical solutions are presented as the ways forward to address otherwise highly contested, political, and politicised fields. This may not simply be the result of class collusion or malevolence (though does not exclude them), and may also include a combination of political expedience, concerns for legitimacy, and incomplete or unsophisticated analyses.

But technicist interpretations rarely consider the way that inequities intersect, or how education policy is mediated and actually implemented. Elsewhere, I show that low-fee private schools mediated, usurped, and undermined the formal institutional framework for education through the ‘shadow institutional framework’, i.e. an informal, codified set of norms and practices (Srivastava, 2008b). Kabeer (2000) highlights the role of ‘unruly practices’ (i.e. policy-practice gaps) and ‘mobilising institutional bias’ as social practices which generate patterns of inclusion and exclusion in all institutional domains. These discursive practices on which legislative terms and rules are framed and enacted
further strengthen the predisposition to mobilise normative constructs and power structures to mute potential transformation and contestation.

In essence, the apparent neutrality of technicist policy responses to formal legislation in education mask and simplify what is a deeply contested social arena, and the often unequal terms through which ‘excluded’ groups are ‘included’. Thus, stop-gap analyses and technicist understandings of education exclusion are primarily concerned with measuring nominal indicators of access (e.g. enrolment rates, drop-rates, teacher-pupil ratios, numbers of classrooms, etc.). They rarely engage with the deeper processes of social stratification that lead to persistent inequities for certain populations and their historical positioning vis-à-vis formal education, preferring (and stopping at) simplistic ‘solutions’.

The process of technicist empiricism thus legitimises and mobilises action around privatisation through four mobilizing frames, which have also been used for the global scaling-up of low-fee private schooling. These are: scarce resources, efficiency, competition-choice-quality, and social equity. The first three frames are overwhelmingly used by proponents of privatisation, while the social equity frame most explicitly anchors contestation, though it is also tactically used by proponents. These provide the master narratives through which evidence is filtered, fashioned, moulded, collated, and disseminated to scale.

In the concluding section, I outline the four mobilizing frames and attempt to draw out their implications for the global scaling-up of low-fee private schooling.9

5. Explicating the Logics of Privatisation and Mobilizing Frames in the Global Scaling-up of Low-fee Private Schooling

5.1 Scarce resources

The scarce resources frame rests on the conundrum that many countries had constrained public budgets preceding EFA. Invariably, even more resources were required to finance the construction of new schools, accommodate more school places, hire additional teachers, and meet increases in recurrent expenditure. The proposed solution was to relax limits on not-for-profit and for-profit private actors operating in education, the logic being that the private sector would supplement public sector resources, and in the case of lower-income populations, low-fee private schools would step in where the government could/did not, to cater for those that were excluded from state provision.

However, in sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the greatest gaps, research suggests that the private sector, including the low-fee sector, has not supplemented additional places, and is certainly not catering for the poorest. Analysis of household survey data from 23 countries in sub-Saharan Africa on private sector participation led Lewin (2007) to conclude: ‘Where the growth of low-cost...non-government providers reflects state failure to serve low/middle income households it is not...likely to reach the ultra-

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9 This borrows from and builds on my previous work (Srivastava, 2010a).
poor and the “last 20%”’ (p. 59). Early evidence in India where private schools are subsidised to provide 25% of their seats for free,\(^{10}\) suggests that this is also true of supposed free private school places in lower fee schools (Noronha & Srivastava, 2013).

Finally, the assertion that the private sector will step in to underserved areas, does not hold. A number of studies in India, including some of Tooley’s colleagues’ (Dixon, 2013), have shown that private schools exist in rural areas that were relatively better developed and with better public infrastructure (Govinda & Bandyopadhyay, 2011; Muralidharan & Kremer, 2007; Pal 2010), while some of the most remote areas remain unserved (Govinda & Bandyopadhyay, 2011). Finally, emerging analysis of a large survey household dataset shows, that where private schools did exist in rural areas, only 2% of villages had three or more private schools (Chudgar & Creed, 2014).

At the macro-level, acceptance of this frame rests on a simplistic application of the supply and demand model, which assumes that increased demand necessarily means insufficient public resources for education. But the issue is as much about investment choices as it is about the scarcity of resources. The frame obscures the fact that financing and providing education publicly and/or privately is about the social and economic investment choices of international players and national governments.

A recent policy brief from the UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Report Team highlights that while the United Kingdom increased funding for basic education, many of the largest donors in education, including the United States and Canada, cut aid to basic education over 2010-2011. What was a $16 billion funding gap for basic education just three years ago, has risen to $26 billion. The 2010 EFA Global Monitoring Report also estimates that low-income countries can mobilise an additional $7 billion by improving revenue collection, allocating a greater percentage of national budgets to education, and increasing the share of financing to basic education within the education budget.

If the education sector is forecasted to take up more of the pie, and if we ardently believe in the principles of free and compulsory education, it does not immediately follow that there will be inadequate resources for expansion. We can choose to make public investment in education a priority by diverting funds from other sectors which may be better suited to privatisation. ‘High achievers’ and early adopters in universalising primary education (e.g. Korea, Malaysia, Sri Lanka) successfully expanded primary education in times of economic constraint by doing just that (Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2005). Thus, while developing countries have constrained public budgets, the persistence of scarce resources for education, particularly for basic education, is not a fixed variable. It exists because we let it.

### 5.2 Efficiency

The efficiency frame rests on the acceptance of poor governance and weak institutions, with the state either seeking inappropriate interests, euphemised as ‘public resource

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\(^{10}\) This was mandated by the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 effective as of 2010. Section 12(1)(c) of the Act compels all private schools to provide 25% of their seats in Class 1 (or pre-primary, as appropriate) to be provided for free to children belonging to socially and economically disadvantaged children, and to be retained until the full cycle of elementary education (Class 8). Schools are to be reimbursed by the state at the level of state education expenditure or tuition fee, whichever is less.
leakage', or incapable of maximising resources. These deficiencies are seen to be self-regulated by the market. The proposed solution is to open the education sector to private actors with various arrangements for financing and managing education, while simultaneously relaxing regulations governing the private sector on the assumption that it is more efficient.

As noted above, PPPs and ‘multistakeholder partnerships’ with different actors (e.g. NGOs, foundations, faith-based organisations, corporations) are in vogue as proposed strategies. The claim is that as ‘the private sector assumes the responsibility for the risk inherent in the ownership and efficient operation [of schools]’ (Patrinos et al., 2009, p. 3), provision will improve. Welch (1998) asserts such assumptions are driven by a ‘cult of efficiency’ resting on ‘the assumed grounds that the public sector is inefficient, but at the same time the public sector is made increasingly captive to the argument that it must run on business lines to be efficient’ (p. 159) further disempowering it.

However, even on technical grounds, it follows that transaction costs will likely increase as the introduction of multiple actors introduces further complexity of oversight of the system for the state with ‘much greater risk of coordination failure and lower efficiency’ (Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2005, p. 144). There is little dissonance to proponents by the fact that governments will have to further invest their (already scarce—as accepted in the frame above) resources and create new structures for contracting, monitoring, and overseeing the multiple players involved. Early research on the three cases above (Uganda, India, Pakistan) shows complexities to efficiency including incomplete information, unclear procedures, and unestablished structures for monitoring education PPPs (Brans, 2011; Humayun et al., 2013; Srivastava et al., 2013), including low-fee private schools under PPP agreements (Brans, 2011; Humayun et al., 2013).

The general disinvestment in state education structures such as state inspectorates has further aggravated system efficiency regarding the regulation and coordination of private schools, particularly in contexts like India with highly decentralised systems (Tilak, 2007). Research in India (including Tooley’s), Pakistan, Nigeria, Kenya, and Malawi shows that low-fee private schools often gain recognition through informal practices and bribery, not meeting set norms (Chimombo, 2009; Härmä & Adefisayo 2013; Humayun et al., 2013; Ohara, 2013; Rose & Adelabu, 2007; Srivastava, 2008b; Stern & Heyneman, 2013; Tooley & Dixon, 2005a).

Poor monitoring mechanisms, dysfunctional inspectorates, and in-built perverse incentives in the regulatory education framework in many countries, have led to further coordination failures with serious implications for schooling supply in the low-fee private sector. This fuels the shadow institutional framework that ultimately undermines the formal regulatory framework for education, and thus, the efficiency of the sector as a whole.

Finally, nominal concerns for crude over productive efficiency in this frame negate the substantial public investment in infrastructure (e.g. roads, electricity, land at concessional rates, etc.) that motivate individuals to set up private schools in particular areas as discussed above. Research comparing delivery costs of state and low-fee private or other private schools do not take the full costing of public sector investment into account.
5.3 Competition-choice-quality

The competition-choice-quality frame rests on the logic that privatisation measures, most notably increasing numbers of private schools and choice mechanisms (e.g. vouchers; subsidies), infuse competition and provide incentives for performance, the by-product being increased quality. The discussion is mute on the fact that there are few or any incentives (which are necessary levers for change) for state schools to compete within the public sector, or against the private sector. Unlike traditional applications of this frame to ‘Western’ countries (typically, Australia, England, and the US) where the focus has largely been on relaxing catchment restrictions to infuse competition within the public sector or diversify school supply with public monies, the application to developing countries is driven in a context of increased private non-state action.

Choice and competition are less strongly framed as interactions between public and private sectors. There is a de facto acceptance that the public sector is of such poor quality that only those with no other recourse would ever access it. The discussion is vacuous of serious considerations on how to redress quality concerns in the public sector, which, despite the growth of private schools, still caters for the majority of children, particularly the majority of disadvantaged children, in many countries.

Instead, the focus is on increasing choice between (low-fee) private schools for disadvantaged groups. Further, while the private sector is exalted as the ‘poor’s best chance’, there is no serious engagement with the implications of the hyper-segmentation of the private sector (e.g. low-fee, medium-fee, high-fee, elite private schools) in which the highest-fee schools (hence, the highest quality from this frame) are reserved for the most advantaged.

Using the rhetoric of the ‘right to choose’ supposedly ‘better’ (i.e. ‘private’) schools, targeted subsidies and vouchers are commonly proposed to bypass dysfunctional state schools without actively mobilising to improve them, or to open access to elite schools. These measures do not address grave societal divisions that perpetuate fundamentally unequal systems. While subsidies and vouchers may increase the affordability of lower-fee private schools for certain groups, in the hyper-segmented education contexts described above, they are unlikely to enable the most disadvantaged to access schools occupying the highest stratum of advantage. Furthermore, there is little to suggest that even if the most disadvantaged gained access to those schools, power relations between those students and teachers, and among students, would ease social stratification.

In India, where such an experiment is currently underway through the 25% free seats provision of the Right to Education Act, initial results are not favourable. There are numerous media reports of casteism and second-class treatment of these students, an extension of existing discrimination in education (Ramachandran & Naorem, 2013). Initial research also indicates that the most disadvantaged were unable to access free places in the early phase of implementation, which were claimed by the relatively less disadvantaged with the ‘right’ social networks (Noronha & Srivastava, 2013).

Quality considerations in this frame are largely technocratic focusing on input (e.g. facilities, teachers, experience) and output (e.g. achievement levels, pass rates) indicators, and tend to ignore schooling processes (e.g. pedagogic practices, student-
teacher/teacher-parent power relations) and societal outcomes (e.g. social cohesion, social mobility). There is little acknowledgement of gender and social class gaps, and of the societal implications of increasingly privatised and segmented education systems in which high-fee, medium-fee, low-fee, and state schools exist and, where every social group has its place. The potential of incentive structures to overcome these barriers through competition when those with any power and the mobilised poor exit en masse, is unlikely.

Finally, there is little engagement with actual choice-making behaviour, which may not be solely or even primarily about quality. Low-fee private school choice may also be related to perceived social status, prestige, gender norms, parental aspirations, ideology, or concerns with social closure. In Ghana, household perceptions about the better quality of low-fee private schools were ‘based on beliefs rather than realities’ (Akaguri, 2011, p. vii). They did not match actual examination results, but were deeply held.

In the same study area, Akyeampong and Rolleston (2013) found that ‘the power of image and marketing in shaping attitudes towards low-fee private schooling’ was key, reflecting a bias and reinforcing peer group effects, rather than superior provision. In India, my work showed that parents accessed these schools to distance themselves from households they considered to be worse off, and for better prospects in the marriage and labour markets for girls and boys respectively (Srivastava, 2008a). Similar findings have come out of Pakistan (Fennell, 2013).

The competition-choice-quality frame rests as much on ideological assumptions that private schools of all types are uniformly better, and that there is a private school advantage as it does on evidence, which is decidedly mixed. Research on inputs and achievement, the two most commonly studied areas in the sector are reviewed below (see McIoughlin, 2013; Srivastava, 2013 for broader reviews).

5.3.1 Inputs

Supply-wise at an aggregate level, most of the literature shows that there are more public than low-fee private schools. Some studies have compared a range of inputs across private schools serving lower income populations and government schools. These private schools performed better on some attributes, but worse on others (i.e. building facilities, pupil-toilet ratios, pupil-teacher ratio) (e.g. Akaguri, 2011; Ngware et al., 2010; Tooley & Dixon, 2006). In no study (including Tooley’s work) do private schools serving lower-income groups perform universally better on all attributes.

The only area in which all the research on low-fee private schools converges is that these schools are staffed by less qualified, poorly paid teachers compared to government schools; that their work is tightly controlled; and that low-fee private schools regularly face challenges of teacher attrition and turnover. In short, low-fee private schools keep their fees comparatively low by cutting recurrent costs, mainly by paying low teachers’ salaries. Controversially, in their study on Pakistan, Andrabi et al. (2008) suggest that the use of unqualified, lesser paid teachers in these schools who have secondary education, may not necessarily compromise quality at the primary level, because they are local,
accountable (less absent), predominantly female, and thus, ‘the cheapest source of labor’ (p. 331).

Positioning women as cheap labour in the low-fee private sector, and the associated deleterious effects of the feminization of teaching, a rich area of study in education research in ‘Western’ contexts is not addressed. At the very least, it should raise serious concerns about the access to equitable resources, the most important being teachers. We must also question the quality implications of the latent acceptance of less skilled and poorly paid teachers as suitable alternatives for expanding education to disadvantaged children. Nambissan (2010) asserts, ‘the advocacy of budget schools for the poor and for “para skilling” to cut costs and maximise profits is a travesty of social justice and the right to education’ (p. 735).

5.3.2 Achievement

Studies (including Tooley’s work) examining comparative achievement in Ghana, India, Kenya, and Nigeria have mixed results (Akaguri, 2011; Chudgar & Quin, 2012; Dixon et al., 2013; Rangaraju et al., 2012; Tooley et al., 2010) Furthermore, a recent RCT, a technique propagated as the ‘gold standard’ for research in education interventions, revealed nominal or no relative achievement advantage in Andhra Pradesh, India (Muralidharan & Sundaraman, 2013).

Most existing studies do not account for sorting into school type, i.e. children from better-off and better informed families tending to enrol in private schools (see Chudgar & Quin, 2012 for review). For India, where most of this work has been done, Chudgar and Quin (2012) highlight four studies that have attempted to account or correct for the selection issue (Desai et al., 2008; French & Kingdon, 2010; Goyal, 2009; Kingdon, 1996). These studies tend to find a significant positive private school effect, but after making the appropriate corrections it is weakened. Chudgar and Quin (2012) point to the limited generalizability of these studies, and note that their own work using a propensity score matching technique, does not find any significant effect of low-fee private schools.

In fact, closer readings of Tooley and his colleagues’ work also reveal variation.11 They found a private school advantage in mathematics and English (the latter to be expected since many private schools were purportedly English-medium) in Andhra Pradesh. But, the achievement gap narrowed when background variables were controlled for, and disappeared in the case of Urdu (Tooley et al., 2010). Dixon et al.’s (2013) fresh analysis of their original data on slum areas of Nairobi found a significant positive relationship between private school attendance and test scores in mathematics and Kiswahili, but no statistically significant difference in English. In all tests, boys fared less well than girls. The private school effect was reduced for English and Kiswahili for boys, taking into account pupil characteristics (i.e., IQ, family income, sex, age), which also reduced the attainment gap with girls.

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11 It is discussed here because of the central role that Tooley’s work has played in mobilising initiatives scaling-up the low-fee private sector.
These results and those in the broader literature point to the need for **nuanced** interpretation when assessing quality in terms of achievement. Low-fee private schools may be better at some things and under certain conditions than state schools, but not in others. The question is not whether low-fee private schools are uniformly better, but in what instances, under which circumstances, and owing to which background characteristics do students in different school types achieve higher results?

### 5.4 Social equity

The social equity frame occupies a distinct place among the mobilizing frames. It is most strongly used by opponents to coalesce contestation, yet tactically used by proponents to fuse concepts which would otherwise seem oppositional. Opponents, arguing that education should be largely publicly provided, appeal to the human rights discourse and embed contestation within the multiple international declarations of basic human rights and education for all, and concepts of equality of opportunity and social cohesion. Proponents of privatisation most commonly employ the slice of the rights discourse focusing on individual rights in combination with the competition-choice-quality frame to argue that increased privatisation, particularly, ‘affordable’ low-fee schools, will extend avenues of social mobility, and ultimately, social equity.

While it is true that state sector dysfunctions persist and are an impetus for some families to access the low-fee sector, the question is, *for whom is it affordable and for how long?* Affordability is not a one-time event. For the poorest and most excluded households, it is inextricably linked to life events and daily working conditions. It is aggravated by, among other things, seasonal migration, fluctuations in food prices, household vulnerability to health and other insecurities—in short, it is affected by multiple and intersecting inequities (Kabeer, 2000).

Factors such as household income, location, gender, and caste, disproportionately aggravate access to education, which is further aggravated in the private sector, a fact well-established in the literature. Private schooling participation (including the low-fee private sector) in various contexts shows low-fee and other private schools to be unaffordable to the most disadvantaged, i.e. low-caste groups, Muslim groups (in India), and poor households falling in the last quintile of the poverty index (e.g. Akyeampong & Rolleston, 2013; Harma, 2009; Lewin, 2007). Furthermore, there is research to suggest that access to low-fee schools is often for just a few initial years when fees in the sector are lowest, and that there is frequent switching between the low-fee and state sectors and between low-fee schools because of costs (Noronha & Srivastava, 2013; Srivastava, 2008a).

On closer reading, Tooley and his colleagues’ insinuations of ‘affordable’ access can also be challenged by their own research. Tooley and Dixon (2005b) note that low-fee private school proprietors in Nigeria and India were themselves wise to the fact that the more disadvantaged among their clients, described typically as orphans, more financially unstable, or migrants, would be unable to pay the ‘low’ fees charged. Thus, a proportion of places in their sample schools in Makoko and Hyderabad were provided for free or at concessionary rates.
Similar results were found in India and Nigeria by other researchers (Härmä, 2009; Rose & Adelabu, 2007, Srivastava, 2007; 2008b). There is controversy surrounding Tooley and Dixon’s implications that concessions are philanthropic (Sarangapani & Winch, 2010). Other research shows that such concessions are likely marketing ploys by low-fee private school owners to retain their clientele (see e.g. Härmä, 2009; Rose & Adelabu, 2007; Srivastava, 2007).

Notably, Tooley and his team’s research is in line with the rather well-established pattern indicating gender bias favouring private school access for boys. In Andhra Pradesh, boys were more likely to be in private unaided schools in the urban and rural districts of their study (Tooley & Dixon, 2006). They concluded this was representative of the schooling situation more generally. The team’s later work in Bihar, classed as an ‘educationally backward’ state in India, also shows similar negative patterns for girls’ enrolment (Rangaraju et al., 2012). Thus, claims that low-fee private school access can address other entrenched inequities can be seriously questioned using Tooley and his team’s own research.

Nonetheless, while the broader rights discourse may be compelling, opponents to privatisation have failed to engage inadequately with the fact that education and schooling are inherently contested and infused with power and advantage. This is likely linked to the advantaged position that middle-class groups enjoy in hyper-segmented privatised education contexts. For example, Carney (2003) notes the ‘reluctance of higher status groups to engage seriously with other groups for the purposes of promoting the state education “project”, in response to privatisation measures in Nepal. Opponents of privatisation must seriously propose measures to address existing inequities in the public sector.

These ideas are not new. Bourdieusian applications to education have revealed it as a site of ‘symbolic violence’ in which education can be used to emancipate, but also to restructure society along new social capital arrangements to exclude new/other groups. In the face of recognised state sector dysfunctions, the challenge for opponents is to mobilise credible and more immediate proposals to address existing inequities in the public sector, and to address the urgent need for quality education for all. For, there is too much at stake not to.

References


